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UNUSED RIPARIAN WATER RIGHTS IN WASHINGTONDepartment of Ecology v. Abbott, 103 Wn. 2d 686, 694 P.2d 1071
(1985).
In Department of Ecology v. Abbott, 1 the Washington Supreme Court
addressed the long-standing question 2 of whether landowners who failed to
exercise consumptive riparian rights3 within a reasonable period after the
adoption of the Water Code of 1917 (1917 Code) 4 lost those rights. The
question arose when a riparian landowner, who had registered consumptive
water rights as required by statute in 1971, was denied those rights in a
1982 stream adjudication. The basis for the denial was that the landowner's
riparian rights had not been continuously exercised since 1917. The Water
Rights Registration Act, 5 with which the landowner complied in 1971,
required that all riparian landowners register their water rights, whether
exercised or not. In 1969, the legislature repealed a provision of the Water
Rights Registration Act that would have extinguished unused riparian
rights in Washington. 6 Nevertheless, the Washington Supreme Court
"held ' 7 (1) that the 1917 Code established prior appropriation as the
dominant water law in Washington; 8 (2) that after 1917 new water rights
were acquired only by permit, and (3) that water rights existing in 1917 but
not put to beneficial use by 1932 were relinquished. 9
1. 103 Wn. 2d 686, 694 P.2d 1071 (1985).
2. Corker &Roe, Washington'sNew WaterRightsLaw-mprovementsNeeded,44 WASH. L. REv.
85 (1968); Horowitz, RiparianandAppropriationRights to the Use of Waterin Washington, 7 WASH. L.
REv. 197 (1932); Johnson, Riparianand PublicRights to Lakes and Streams, 35 WASH. L. REv. 580
(1960); Morris, Washington Water Rights-A Sketch, 31 WASH. L. REv. 243 (1956).
3. The court defined riparian water rights as those deriving from "ownership of land contiguous to
or traversed by a watercourse." 103 Wn. 2d at 689, 694 P.2d at 1073.
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.03 (1983).
5. Id. § 90.14.
6. 1969 Wash. Laws 2801.
7. The court's statement is not a holding in the usual sense because the questions answered were not
before the court on appeal; the court's several "holdings" are in the nature of declaratory judgments,
although made on the court's own motion.
8. 103 Wn. 2d at 687,694 P.2d at 1072. Prior appropriation is a priority system in which the first to
claim and beneficially use water has a permanent legal right to continue to do so as against subsequent
appropriators.
9. Id. at 695, 694 P.2d at 1076. This apparently arbitrary notice period was suggested by the
appellant, Department of Ecology. The court states that "15 years after enactment of the water code, we
now hold, as a matter of law, constitutes adequate notice." Id. The cutoff date adopted is 1932, but the
date on which these unused rights were relinquished appears to be 1917. The court's holding established
1917 as the date on which "existing water rights not put to beneficial use are relinquished." Id. at 687,
694 P.2d at 1072.
The court also considered whether the forfeiture of riparian rights effects an unconstitutional taking.
This issue exceeds the scope of this survey. The case does raise several constitutional questions. Cf.
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 297 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring) (state cannot take riparian
rights to accretions without due process by simple device of asserting retroactively that the property it
has taken never existed at all).
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In Washington's "mixed" or hybrid system l° of riparian and appropri-

ative water rights, the ascendancy of one right has not heretofore marked
the extinction of the other." Broadly interpreted, Abbott could mean an
abrupt reversal of this pattern of accommodation. ' 2 Abbott could in fact be
read to mean the retroactive extinction of all consumptive riparian water
rights not in continuous use since 1932. Because the opinion is based in
part on an oversight 13 and in part on a misunderstanding of the nature of
riparian rights in Washington, its reach may, however, be limited.
10. See generall_\3 W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS INTHE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 570-613
(1977).
I1. E.g., Bach v. Sarich, 74 Wn. 2d 575, 580, 445 P.2d 648, 651-52 (1968) (riparian owners of
non-navigable lake have right to use entire surface of lake); Snively v. Jaber, 48 Wn. 2d 815, 296 P.2d
1015 (1956) (riparian owners may enjoin uses by licensees of other riparian owners where such use
constitutes a nuisance); Proctor v. Sim, 134 Wash. 606, 236 P. 114 (1925) (riparian rights apply to
waters of non-navigable lakes); In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 13,224 P. 29. 31 (1924) (doctrines of
appropriation and riparian rights have been recognized in Washington from an early date and are not
antagonistic); Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 545-46, 217 P. 23, 24 (1923) (Washington courts have
adhered to riparian rights doctrine as a primary doctrine; riparian rights apply to waters of nonnavigable streams); see also Johnson, supra note 2, at 615 (Washington courts are holding the line on
expansion of the appropriation system and applying viable principles of riparianism wherever appropriate).
12. The riparian and appropriation systems have been coordinated in various ways. Appropriations
made on the public domain have been given priority over the water rights of subsequent riparian owners.
fI re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash. 635, 642-43, 299 P. 649, 651 (1931) (right of prior appropriation of
water from public domain is superior to riparian rights and subsequent appropriations). Conversely. a
homesteader who acquired a federal patent had priority over later appropriators. In re Alpowa Creek,
129 Wash. 9, 13,224 P. 29, 31 (1924). A later appropriator could, however, condemn the water rights of
a riparian landowner under Washington's broad eminent domain provisions. In re Clinton Water Dist..
36 Wn. 2d 284, 289, 218 P.2d 309, 312-13 (1950) (constitutional provisions for eminent domain are
broad in Washington). Cf Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 52, 201 P. 702, 707 (1921) (special
eminent domain statute was enacted in 1891 which provided a ready means for securing a right of way
for ditches, flumes, or canals for irrigation and other purposes). By condemnation, certain riparian
rights could be acquired, restricted to a reasonable amount of water in use on the land at the time of
condemnation, or restricted to a reasonable prospective use. See infra note 65 (discussion of condemnation cases).
Rights of riparian owners were further modified in condemnations or stream adjudications. See
1889-1890 Wash. Laws 723-28; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.110, 90.44.220 (1983) (statutory adjudication procedures). The court has also refused relief where no substantial damage to riparian
owners occurred. Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 549, 217 P. 23, 25 (1923) (court modified common
law riparian rights by refusing relief in condemnation to riparian landowner where no substantial
damage occurred and by granting relief where present or prospective damages exist). That is, riparian
owners would be compensated only for actual losses. Finally, the reported cases reflect attempts by
referees to apportion water rights in stream adjudications equitably. In re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash.
635,643, 299 Wash. 649, 651 (1931) ("the decree has worked as nearly exact justice as is possible. "); In
re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 18, 224 P. 29, 33 (1924) (referee arrived at equitable conclusions where
long lapse of time resulted in unsatisfactory testimony). In Abbott, for example, the referee confirmed
the respondent's right to some unspecified amount of water even though the referee found that the
respondent had no riparian rights and even though he had not put his claimed appropriation to actual use
for over ten years.
13. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text (discussion of Water Rights Act of 1967).

Unused Riparian Water Rights
I.

OVERVIEW OF WASHINGTON'S SYSTEM OF WATER
ALLOCATION

Washington has a hybrid system of water allocation which recognizes
both riparian and prior appropriation doctrines. 14 Under the common law
as adopted in Washington, riparian rights inhere in the land. 15 These rights
relate back to the date the first landowner settled or filed a claim to public
land 16 and they vest upon passage of title from public to private ownership. 17 When riparian land is conveyed from the federal government to
private individuals, the riparian rights arise as incidents of ownership.
These rights are shared by all riparian landowners on a watercourse 8 and
may be used at will by the riparian owner within the source watershed. 19
The central principle of the riparian system was stated succinctly by the
California Supreme Court in 1886: "Use did not create the right, and disuse
20
cannot destroy or suspend it."
In Washington, the riparian landowners are limited to reasonable use of
bordering water; their use must be reasonable as to other riparian landowners on the waterbody. 2 1 "Natural" or "domestic" uses, such as
14. Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 281, 49 P. 495, 496 (1897) (adopting hybrid system of
P.674 (1886)). See also
appropriative and riparian water rights from Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255,
1891 Wash. Laws 327; 1885-1886 Wash. Laws 508; see generallyJohnson, supranote 2; W. HUTCHINS,
supra note 10.
15. Benton v. Johncox, 17 Wash. 277, 281,49 P. 495,496 (1897) (riparian right to natural flow of
stream is as much a part of soil as the stones scattered over it); Rigney v. Tacoma Light & Water Co., 9
Wash. 576, 38 P. 147 (1894) (riparian rights annexed to soil, thus part of fee title).
16. Benton, 17 Wash. at 288, 49 P. at 498-99.
17. Nesalhous v. Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 623-24, 88 P. 1032, 1033 (1907).
18. Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. 558, 573, 250 P. 41, 46 (1926).
19. Mally v. Weidensteiner, 88 Wash. 398, 402, 153 P. 342, 344 (1915).
20. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 361-62, 10 P. 674, 735 (1886).
21. Geddis v. Parrish, 1Wash. 587, 21 P. 314 (1889) (Washington court adopted reasonable use
theory of riparian rights rather than undiminished natural flow theory).
The riparian landowner's water rights in Washington have included the right to irrigate, Nesalhous v.
Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 88 P. 1032 (1907) (riparian owner's reasonable use of water to irrigate was right
attaching to riparian ownership); the right to the flow of the stream, Haberman v. Sander, 166 Wash.
453,463, 7 P.2d 563,566 (1932) (riparian claims, as against senior appropriator, enforced to preserve
flow of stream adequate for domestic water uses, including stock watering and fruit orchard); the right
to the purity of the water, Crook v. Hewitt, 4 Wash. 749, 31 P. 28 (1892); the right to prevent erosion of
the banks, id.; the right to fish, boat, and the right to claim title to the beds of non-navigable lakes and
streams, Griffith v. Holman, 23 Wash. 347, 63 P. 239 (1900) (riparian right to hold title to the bed if
water is non-navigable and exclusive rights of riparian owners to fish where beds are owned); In re
Clinton Water Dist., 36 Wn. 2d 284, 287, 218 P.2d 309, 312 (1950) (vested riparian rights include right
to recreation); the right to "natural" or "domestic" uses, Nielson v. Sponer, 46 Wash. 14, 89 P. 155
(1907) (under common law, riparian owner has right to ordinary use for domestic purposes and this right
is free of reasonable use test); and the right to make any other use that does not damage other riparian
landowners.

t0
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drinking, washing, gardening, and watering livestock have been tradi22
tionally exempted from the reasonable use requirement.
By statute, the territorial legislature recognized prior appropriation in its
system of water allocation for arid regions in 1873.23 The basic principle of
prior appropriation is "first in time, first in right." Appropriated rights
depend on usage and are lost by nonuse (although such losses would rarely
have occurred before 1967).24 An appropriative right is created by (1)
notice of an intent to appropriate and (2) perfection of the right by putting
the claimed water to beneficial use with reasonable diligence.25
In 1917 the Washington Water Code was passed. The first provision of
the 1917 Code established the present permit system of appropriation while
expressly preserving existing water rights. 26 The 1917 Code's fourth provision2 7 expanded the appropriator's right to purchase used or unused water
22. Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 Wash. at 574-78. 250 P. at 46-48 (citing cases) (riparian
owner has right to ordinary use of water flowing past his land, for purpose of supplying his natural wants
including domestic purposes of home or farm: these natural uses may, if necessary. consume all the
water of the stream).
The reasons for this preference are simple: the uses are de minimus. they would be nearly impossible
to prevent, and they are reasonable by definition because they sustain life.
In contrast to the preferred natural uses, "'artificial" uses, such as large-scale irrigation or manufacturing. are subject to a reasonable use requirement. Id. In Washington, irrigation was encouraged. and
thus the riparian landowner's right to irrigate was a specifically protected artificial use. See. e.g..
1889-1890 Wash. Laws 722 (no condemnation of water already in use for irrigation).
23.
1873 Wash. Laws 520. The doctrine of appropriation originally applied in Washington only to
public lands: once land ceased to be public and became private property. appropriators could no longer
claim water except by condemnation. See Benton v. Johncox. 17 Wash. 277,289, 49 P. 495.499 (1897).
This limit to appropriation was rejected in Drake v. Smith, 54 Wn. 2d 57. 61, 337 P.2d 1059. 1061
(1959). although it had been applied by that court the year before in Wallace v. Weitman. 52 Wn. 2d
585. 586-87. 328 P.2d 157, 159 (1958).
24. Proof of abandonment is difficult because it consists of evidence of intent to abandon and
evidence of resulting actual abandonment. Thorpe v. McBride, 75 Wash. 466,468-69, 135 P. 228. 229
( 1913) (nonuse for ten years without evidence of intent to abandon does not constitute abandonment):
Miller v. Wheeler, 54 Wash. 429, 453, 103 P. 641. 643 (1909). There was no forfeiture statute in
Washington until 1967.
25. E.g.. In re Alpowa Creek. 129 Wash. 9. 13, 224 P. 29, 31 (1924).
These rights may be acquired regardless of land ownership. Appropriated water may be used on
riparian or non-riparian land. Id. at 18, 224 P. at 33 (appropriator may use his water any way he sees fit:
he need not own any land). Riparian landowners needing more than their reasonable share front their
watercourse could divert more, if they put it to beneficial use and met the statutory requirements.
Nesalhous v. Walker, 45 Wash. 621, 626, 88 P. 1032. 1033 (1907).
26. WASH. REv. CODE § 90.03.010 (1983):
Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the public, and any right thereto, or to
the use thereof, shall be hereafter acquired only by appropriation for a beneficial use and in the
manner provided and not otherwise: and, as between appropriations, the first in time shall be the
first in right. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or modify the
existing rights of any riparian owner, or any existing right acquired by appropriation, or otherwise.
They shall, however, be subject to condemnation as provided in WASH. REv CODE
§ 90.03.040 . . ..
27. Id. § 90.03.040. Earlier enactments provided for condemnation awards based on actual injury
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rights from riparian landowners. 28 This provision allowed any person,
whether a private individual or a public irrigation district, to exercise the
right of eminent domain to condemn an inferior use of water for a superior
use. 29 By this means, the 1917 Code sought to ensure the most beneficial
use of the state's waters.
The Water Rights Registration Act of 1967, as amended in 1969, was
intended "to provide adequate records for efficient administration of the
state's waters, and to cause a return to the state of any water rights which are
no longer exercised by putting said waters to beneficial use." 30 The statute
requires that:
All persons using or claiming the right to withdraw or divert and make
beneficial use of public surface or ground waters of the state, except as
hereinafter provided in this section, shall file with the department of water
resources not later than June 30, 1974, a statement of claim for each water
31
right asserted on a form provided by the department.
Certain minimal uses were exempted from the permit system. 32 These
done to the condemnee. 1889-1890 Wash. Laws 19-22.
28. For purposes of condemnation, the use of water in Washington was declared to be a public use.
WASH. REv. CODE § 90.03.040 (1983). In a condemnation proceeding:
It]he court shall determine what use will be for the greatest public benefit, and that use shall be
deemed a superior one: Provided, That no property right in water or the use of water shall be
acquired hereunder by condemnation for irrigation purposes, which shall deprive any person of
such quantity of water as may be reasonably necessary for the irrigation of his land then under
irrigation to the full extent of the soil, by the most economical method of artificial irrigation
applicable to such land according to the usual methods of artificial irrigation employed in the
vicinity where such land is situated.
Id.
29. Id. § 90.03.040.
30. Id. § 90.14.010. The legislative findings included:
(3) A strong beneficial use requirement as a condition precedent to the continued ownership of a
right to withdraw or divert water is essential to the orderly development of the state;
(5) All rights to divert or withdraw water, except riparian rights which do not diminish the
quantity of water remaining in the source such as boating, swimming, and other recreational and
aesthetic uses must be subjected to the beneficial use requirement.
Id. § 90.14.020.
In 1979, the legislature added a state water policy statement to the 1917 Code:
It is the policy of the state to promote the use of the public waters in a fashion which provides for
obtaining maximum net benefits arising from both diversionary uses of the state's public waters
and the retention of waters within streams and lakes in sufficient quantity and quality to protect
instream and natural values and rights.
Id. § 90.03.005.
31. Id. § 90.14.041.
32. Id. § 90.14.051 ("Except, however, that any claim for diversion or withdrawal of surface or
ground water for those uses described in the exemption from the permit requirement of RCW 90.44.050
may be filed on a short form to be provided by the department."). The 1967 Act expressly gives the
person claiming "such minimal uses" an option of filing on a standard form and receiving a permit or
certificate. The same option is provided for minimal users in the Ground Water Act.
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exempted uses, incorporated by reference into the 1967 Registration Act
from the Public Ground Water Act, 33 are (1) for stock-watering purposes,
(2) for the watering of a lawn or of a noncommercial garden not exceeding
one-half acre in area, (3) for single or group domestic uses in an amount not
exceeding five thousand gallons a day, or (4) for an industrial purpose in an
34
amount not exceeding five thousand gallons a day.
The 1967 Registration Act provides for forfeiture of unused water
rights. 35 Before 1967, appropriative water rights could be lost by abandonment, which was difficult to prove, 36 or by laches. Riparian rights were not
lost by disuse, but were incidents of riparian land ownership. The 1967 Act
provided for relinquishment of both types of water rights for failure to
beneficially use without sufficient cause for five years. 37
1I.

SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

In the early 1900's, John Fuher, a riparian landowner, operated a sawmill
on Deadman Creek. 38 He diverted water from the creek for logwashing. In
1911, he filed a notice of appropriation with the Spokane county auditor for
4.0 cubic feet per second (c.f.s.) for irrigation and other beneficial uses, 39
but he had not irrigated by 1917.40 In either 1922 or 1923, Fuher irrigated
about fifteen acres. 4 1 The court did not indicate the extent of Fuher's
irrigation after 1923, although it evidently was not continuous.
33. Id. § 90.44.050.
34. The rights registered on short forms fall outside the scope of the water rights adjudication
procedures set forth in the 1967 Act. Id. §§ 90.14.051, 90.14.081. The 1967 Act thus provides a permit
exemption for "minimal uses" of surface water. Id. § 90.14.051. The Abbott court stated that no
exception was made in the 1917 Code for natural uses. 103 Wn. 2d at 692,694 P.2d at 1074-75. Under
the common law, however, natural uses were part of any riparian owner's "existing rights," and thus
were preserved by the terms of the 1917 Code ("subject to existing rights"). The 1967 Act made special
provisions for these rights. See W. HUTCHINS, supranote 10, at 613 n.23 1.The express legislative policy
of protecting "natural rights" as set forth in WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.005 (1983), which would
include a riparian owner's "natural rights, " is consistent with the Act's special provisions for minimal
uses.

35. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.160 (1983).
36. See supra note 24 (discussion of abandonment).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.170 (1983). The forfeiture provisions apply to riparian uses:
Any person entitled to divert or withdraw waters of the state by virtue of his ownership of land
abutting a stream, lake, or watercourse, who abandons the same, or who voluntarily fails, without
sufficient cause, to beneficially use all or part of said right to withdraw or divert said water for any
period of five successive years after the effective date of this act shall relinquish such right or
portion thereof, and such right or portion thereof shall revert to the state, and the waters affected by
said right shall become available for appropriation. . ..
Id. § 90.14.170.
38. 103 Wn. 2d at 688, 694 P.2d at 1072-73.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 696, 694 P.2d at 1077.
41. Id. at 688, 694 P.2d at 1072-73.

Unused Riparian Water Rights
Fuher used the sawmill continuously until the mid-1940's, 4 2 when J.C.
Riddle 43 acquired Fuher's land. Whether or not Riddle continued to operate
the sawmill is unclear. 44 Riddle irrigated for "at least 15 to 20 years," 45 but
the court did not say when Riddle began to irrigate or whether he was
actively irrigating when the case arose. 46 In 1971, Riddle filed a timely
water right claim, 47 as required by the Washington Registration Act. Based
on Fuher's riparian status 48 Riddle claimed a right to divert and use 4.0
c.f.s. of water in Deadman Creek to irrigate 200 acres. 49 Riddle had
presumably
irrigated for over a decade on the basis of his 1971 claim for 4.0
c.f S.50
In 1982, the water rights to Deadman Creek were adjudicated, under
unspecified circumstances. 51 The adjudication referee denied Riddle's
claim of 4.0 c.f.s. and confirmed a right to a smaller amount. 52 The
referee's standard for evaluating Riddle's riparian rights was the amount of
water that his predecessor-in-interest, Fuher, had diligently developed and
used within three years of the effective date of the 1917 Code. 53 Because
Fuher had not irrigated by June of 1920, the referee concluded that his
riparian rights had been forfeited. 54 The referee did, however, confirm
Riddle's water right in the amount of Fuher's irrigation in the early 1920's
but on the basis of Fuher's right as a prior appropriator. 55 Under this
analysis, Fuher's notice of a claim in 1911 established his intent to divert
water, and his beneficial use for irrigation in the early 1920's perfected his
42. Id. ("Except for the sawmill, there was no evidence of continuous use between the early 1920's
and the early 1950's.")
43. Mark A. Abbott is not mentioned in the-opinion.
44. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
45. 103 Wn. 2d at 688, 694 P.2d at 1072-73.
46. The court refers to Riddle's "present level ofuse" but does not say what it is. Id. at 696 n.1, 694
P.2d at 1076 n. 1.It appears that Riddle was irrigating 200 acres at the time of adjudication. Id. at 688,
694 P.2d at 1072-73.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 695-96, 694 P.2d at 1075-76.
49. Id. at 688, 694 P.2d at 1072-73.
50. If Riddle was in fact irrigating 200 acres at the time of the 1982 adjudication, then his 1971
claim would be prima facie evidence of his level of use as of 1971. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.081
(1983). Thus, the legal presumption would be that he had used 4.0 c.f.s. for the eleven years between his
registered claim and the stream adjudication.
51. See 1889-1890 Wash. Laws 723-28; WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.03.110, 90.44.220 (1983)
(statutory adjudication procedures).
52. 103 Wn. 2d at 696 n.1,694 P.2d at 1076 n.1.
53. Id. at 693-94, 694 P.2d at 1075-76. The referee may have used three years because that is the
period following enactment of the Public Ground Water Act during which those claiming "existing
rights" could apply for a "certificate of vested right." See W. HUTCHINS, supra note 10, at 607.
54. If Fuher had irrigated as of 1920, rather than a year or two later, the referee would presumably
have confirmed Riddle's riparian water rights in the amount of Fuher's 1920 irrigation.
55. Id. at 696 n.l, 694 P.2d at 1076 n.l.
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appropriative right to the amount actually used. The referee thus denied
Riddle's claim to appropriative rights in excess of those appropriative
rights exercised in the early 1920's, that is, to unused appropriative rights
as well as to unused riparian rights.56
Riddle appealed the referee's denial of his riparian water rights. The
Spokane County Superior Court recognized Riddle's riparian rights and
granted his partial summary judgment motion, remanding to the referee. 57
The trial court concluded that the 1917 Code did not require unexercised
riparian rights to be exercised within any particular time. 58 The trial court
ruled further that riparian common law rights to "ordinary" or "natural"
uses of water were unaffected by the 1917 Code, 59 reasoning that these
rights inhere in riparian ownership and are not lost by disuse. The trial
court also concluded that in 1917 the appropriation permit system applied
only to waters in excess of these natural riparian uses. 60 The supreme court
reversed the trial court's partial summary judgment and remanded the
61
case.
The reach of the Abbott holdings should be limited by these facts.
Unfortunately, as the above summary reflects, essential facts are missing,
several factual statements are inconsistent, and the sequence of events is
fragmented. The fragments of fact scattered throughout the opinion are
insufficient to form a basis for comparison with other factual circumstances. The significance of the sawmill, for example, is not discussed in
the opinion. Whether the sawmill was used by Riddle, thus forming a link
in the chain of continuous beneficial use, is unclear. The court explained
that the sawmill was continued until the mid- 1940's. 62 Then the court stated
that "[e]xcept for the sawmill, there was no evidence of continuous use
between the 1920's and the 1950's." ' 63 The facts as set forth in the opinion
do not give rise to the issues determined by the court, nor do these limited
facts support the court's holdings.

56. The court noted, without explanation, that "at least 50 years were taken to perfect this right.
Id.
57. Id. at 688, 694 P.2d at 1072. The court does not explain the substance of the partial summary
judgment or the matter(s) remanded.
58. Id. at 689, 694 P.2d at 1073.
59. Id. at 688-89, 693, 694 P.2d at 1072-73, 1075.
60. Id. at 693, 694 P.2d at 1075.
61. No mention is made in Abbott of the trial court's ruling on the central issue below, that is. on
Riddle's riparian claim to 4.0 c.f.s. of water to irrigate 200 acres.
62. 103 Wn. 2d 688, 694 P.2d at 1072-73.
63. Id.

Unused Riparian Water Rights
III.

SUMMARY OF THE COURT'S REASONING

The court held first that riparian water rights "existing" 64 in 1917 but not
put to beneficial use by 1932 were relinquished. The issue arose in a 1982
stream adjudication because Riddle claimed certain riparian rights in 1971
that may not have been exercised before 1917. If Riddle's unused riparian
rights were relinquished, then he had none to claim in 1971. The court
reasoned that such unused riparian rights must have been relinquished
because otherwise they would prevent appropriation or riparian develop65
ment by others.
64. id. at 692, 695-96, 694 P.2d at 1075-77. The court did not define its use of "existing rights,"
thus the question of whether inchoate riparian rights were "existing rights" as of 1917 remains
unanswered. The court quoted the 1917 Code and italicized the word "existing," but made no further
comment.
65. Id. at 691, 694 P.2d at 1074. The cases discussed in the opinion do not, however, support this
reasoning. They illustrate instead the ways in which riparian water rights, whether used or unused, have
been appropriated in Washington since statehood. The state's condemnation and water rights adjudication procedures, as illustrated in these cases, were used by private appropriators to challenge and
acquire riparian rights and put riparian water to beneficial use. In support of its forfeiture of unused
riparian rights, the court referred to several cases in which riparian rights were limited to water used
within a "reasonable time." Id. at 691, 694-95, 694 P.2d at 1075-76. The Abbott court measured a
"reasonable time" from the passage of the 1917 Code. In the cases the court referred to, however, a
"reasonable time" had been measured from the time that a riparian owner's rights were challenged in a
stream adjudication or court proceeding. The words "within a reasonable time," italicized by the
Abbott court, had not previously been interpreted to mean within a reasonable time of 1917. See, e.g., In
re Sinlahekin Creek, 162 Wash. 635, 637-42, 299 P. 649, 650-51 (1931) (in adjudication, riparian
rights may be limited or lost where they have not been used at time of trial nor will in future be used);
State v. American Fruit Growers, 135 Wash. 156, 161,237 P. 498,499 (1925) (in adjudication, riparian
landowner must show that he will use water for irrigation at present or within the near future); Brown v.
Chase, 125 Wash. 542,553,217 P. 23, 26 (1923) (riparian right may be appropriated if not beneficially
used within a reasonable time of adjudication); State ex rel. South Fork Log Driving Co. v. Superior
Court, 102 Wash. 460,468, 173 P. 192, 194 (1918) (riparian land must be put to use within a reasonable
time of purchase); State ex rel. Liberty Lake Irrigation Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Wash. 310, 313, 91 P.
968, 969 (1907) (no condemnation of water that riparian owner was using for irrigation or would use for
irrigation within a reasonable time of thecondemnation); State ex rel. Kettle Falls Power & Irrigation
Co. v. Superior Court, 46 Wash. 500, 90 P. 650 (1907). No Washington authority is offered in support of
the forfeiture of unused riparian rights as of 1917.
The court stated (without case citation) that: "Many commentators, and several courts, have
determined that either the statute or the decisional law of this court has eliminated unused riparian
rights." 103 Wn. 2d at 695, 694 P.2d at 1076. The single case authority given in support of forfeiture of
unused riparian rights is State v. American Fruit Growers, 135 Wash. 156,237 P. 498 (1925). American
Fruit is not a forfeiture case. It concerns an adjudication in which the water rights of riparian owners
were quantified; none was lost by forfeiture.
The court referred to a Texas case to support its forfeiture of unused riparian rights. 103 Wn. 2d at
697, 694 P.2d at 1077. Texas case law and Washington case law are not directly comparable; Texas case
law of riparian rights rests on Spanish and Mexican law. Even so, the Spanish and Mexican law at issue
in this line of Texas cases, while not recognizing a riparian right to irrigate, preserved the riparian
landowner's natural uses. See Texas v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853, 861 (Tex. Civ. App.
1961), aff'd, 355 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. 1962) (early Spanish law recognized domestic rights: "personal and
domestic use, which is in accordance with the general freedom which anyone can take the water he
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By logical implication, Abbott requires that riparian rights be continuously exercised once they have been beneficially used. The issue arises
because the riparian rights claimed in Abbott had been exercised within the
grace period, but not continuously. Nevertheless, the court denied Riddle's
claim to riparian water rights. This secondary issue was not directly
discussed, but the logical conclusion from the outcome of the case is that

riparian rights must (1) have been exercised before 1932, (2) have been
exercised continuously, and (3) have been exercised in the same way, that
66
is, for the same use.
The court included the riparian landowner's right to "natural" or domestic uses among those riparian rights extinguished by nonuse. In doing so,

the court overlooked the exemption for natural or "minimal uses" of
surface water, incorporated by reference from the earlier Ground Waters
Act. 67 This oversight led the court to conclude that these minimal uses were
relinquished in 1917 if not continuously used. The court offered no reasoning in support of this, but stated that the legislature had made no such
exemption. 68
IV. EFFECTS OF ABBO7T ON RIPARIAN RIGHTS
The Abbott court may have laid the groundwork for extinguishing the
riparian rights of all but a few landowners in Washington by its new reading
wants to succor his domestic needs"), State v. Hidalgo County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No.
18,443 S.W.2d 728, 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (where statutes sound "uncertain trumpet" there is
room for equitable adjustment) (concurring opinion at 760 explains that domestic uses are not
adjudicated).
66. See infra
notes 85-87 and accompanying text (discussion of change of use requirement). No
reason is given for the requirement of continuous use, except the general observation that unused
riparian rights have presented an obstacle to other water users. The court apparently would affirm the
referee's decision that the respondent had a limited appropriative right to irrigate even though irrigation
had not been continuous since the early 1920's. Although unused appropriative rights have presented
the same obstacle to other water users, the court did not explain its disparate treatment of riparian
owners and appropriators as to continuous use.
67. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
68. 103 Wn. 2d at 693, 694 P.2d at 1075. The court presented no Washington case authority
supporting forfeiture of natural uses not exercised by 1917. The court referred to Proctor v. Sim, 134
Wash. 606,236 P. 114 (1925), as authority on this point. The Proctorcourt held that riparian landowners
on non-navigable lakes have "existing or vested rights" to beneficial use of water for irrigation and
domestic purposes and that any water in excess of these uses is subject to appropriation. Id. at 619.236
P. at 118. The Abbott court interpreted the term "surplus" as used in Proctorto mean "those waters not
already put to use by the riparian." 103 Wn. 2d at 694, 694 P.2d at 1076. The Proctorcourt's holding
was simply that riparians have no vested or existing rights to water in excess of their beneficial uses for
irrigation or for domestic purposes. Proctormeasured the riparian's existing rights as of the present (the
time of the proceeding at hand, here 1925) or prospectively, within a reasonable time in the future. 134
Wash. at 615-16, 619, 236 P. 117-18. In the court's other primary authority, a domestic use exception
was implicit. Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 P. 23 (1923) (where there is an abundance of water
for stock, domestic and other possible beneficial uses, excess water may be subsequently apropriated).
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of the 1917 Code. This reading, under which appropriation becomes the
sole justification for new uses of water since 1917, is inconsistent with the
69
nature of riparian rights in Washington.
The court's holding that existing riparian water rights not put to beneficial use by 1917 are relinquished conflicts with the 1917 Code's express
preservation of existing riparian rights: "Nothing contained in this chapter
shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, or modify the existing rights of any
riparian owner, or any existing right acquired by appropriation, or otherwise." '70 Moreover, the Abbott court included the riparian landowner's
right to natural use among those rights lost if not continuously used. 7 1 This
inclusion is based on the court's erroneous reading of the 1967 Water
Rights Act. The court apparently overlooked the minimum use exemption
in the 1967 Act which specifically provides for such uses.
The Abbott court's misreading of the 1917 Code has potentially farreaching consequences for riparian landowners. These consequences follow from the retroactive reach of the opinion. The opinion requires that (1)
consumptive riparian rights must have been beneficially exercised before

1932, (2) consumptive riparian rights must have been exercised continuously, and (3) changes in riparian uses must have been approved by the
supervisor of water resources.
A.

Effect of Retroactive Beneficial Use Requirement

Abbott's holding that unused riparian rights were relinquished in 1917 is
retroactive. It therefore casts doubt on the status of riparian rights to all land
patented after 1917.72 The result of the decision may be that riparian lands
69. The Abbott court first held that the 1917 Code established prior appropriation as the dominant
law in Washington. This holding emphasizes the status quo; it does not alter riparian water rights, which
have for over half a century been preserved alongside the predominant appropriation system. However,
the court went on to explain its holding by stating that after 1917 "new water rights" may be acquired
only by permit. This statement is more difficult to assess because the court did not explain what it meant
by the critical term (not used in the 1917 code) "new water rights." 103 Wn. 2d at 687,694 P.2d at 1072.
If the court meant to include new uses of water by riparian owners under the rubric "new water rights,"
the rule it announces does not comport with traditional common law and statutory concepts of riparian
rights. A purchaser of privately held riparian land, for example, who cleared a forest to farm and then
irrigate, did not thereby acquire a "new" right but rather exercised a pre-existing right conveyed to him
as an incident of ownership. Under the common law, the priority of newly exercised riparian rights
related back to the date at which the land first passed to private ownership. The simplest interpretation of
the Abbott court's term "new rights" consistent with the 1917 Code and the common law concept of
riparian rights is that it refers to appropriative rights that did not exist before 1917, and possibly to rights
acquired with respect to lands patented after 1917.
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.010 (1983).
71. 103 Wn. 2d at 695-96, 694 P.2d at 1076-77.
72. The court's holding that riparian rights not exercised by 1932 are lost raises similar questions
regarding state trust land that passed from the federal government to the state after 1932. See, e.g., In re
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patented after 1917 have been stripped of consumptive riparian water rights
even if those rights were exercised. If the Abbott holding is strictly applied,
then, as of 1985, a state or federal land grant or conveyance of riparian
lands after 1917 carried with it no exercisable riparian rights to drinking.
washing, gardening, or other household uses, to small amounts of irrigation, stock watering, or any other consumptive use. 73 The new riparian
owner could make beneficial use of bordering waters only by appropriation
and permit. Such a riparian owner should theoretically have filed a notice of
appropriation and perfected his water rights by beneficial use as soon as he
74
took title after 1917.
Consequently, Abbott may create two classes of riparian landowners in
Washington, those who acquired their land before June 30, 1917, and thus
were able to perfect their riparian water rights by use, and those who
acquired land afterwards, and thus had no consumptive riparian rights to
75
exercise.
Before a court applies a statute retroactively so as to work such a
forfeiture, the statute should provide unambiguous notice of the legislature's intent to terminate the rights at issue. The 1917 Code did not
expressly provide for forfeiture of riparian rights; the Abbott court concedes, as it must, that riparian rights survived the 1917 Code. 76 The
question of what might have been implied in 1917 by "subject to existing
rights" has been variously answered during the last fifty years. The 1917
Code's statutory heading "Existing rights preserved" could have meant
that riparian rights, which inhere in the land, would be unaffected, whether
riparian land was homesteaded before or after 1917. If so, all riparian
owners would be treated alike, regardless of when their land was patented.
Or the term "existing rights" could have referred to rights of existing
Stranger Creek, 77 Wn. 2d 649, 657, 466 P.2d 508, 513 (1970) (holding that the state may establish

riparian water rights on its trust lands to the same extent that such rights could be etablished by private
owner). Similar questions are also raised as to the rights that may be exercised on Indian allotment lands
sold to non-Indians after 1932 and later repurchased by Indians.
73. The statutory exemption for minimal uses and specifically for stock watering necessarily
modifies any application of Abbott. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.22.040 (1983); supra notes 32-37 and
accompanying text.
74. The fifteen-year grace period does not apply to riparian rights in subsequently patented land
because Abbott holds that the law changed as of 1917. The grace period is attached to the 1917 Code: its
purpose is to allow the public time to respond to the change in law. After 1917, Abbott tells us that water
rights could be obtained only by permit.

75. If. for example, two farmers acquired homesteads, one in March 1917 and the other in August
1917. and both irrigated from streams bordering their property continuously to the present. the March
farmer may have a valid claim to the amount of water beneficially used while the August farmer may not.

The August farmer may have been using water illegally and may, as a result of Abbott, be subject to suit
by anyone damaged by his illegal use. See WASH. REV. CODE § 90.03.410(2) (1983).
76.
103 Wn. 2d at 694-95, 694 P.2d at 1076.
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riparian landowners, whether exercised or not, as of 1917. A third possibility was that "existing rights" referred to rights actually exercised by
1917. This appears to be the interpretation in Abbott. Abbott's
interpretation leaves open the question of whether the exercise of any one
riparian right would imply exercise of others. It also overrules earlier
Washington Supreme Court interpretations of "subject to existing rights,"
such as Church v. Barnes,77 in which a riparian right to natural uses, not
exercised until 1919, was held to be preserved by the language of the 1917
Code.
B.

Effect of RetroactiveRequirement of Continuous Use

A further consequence of theAbbott court's rejection of Riddle's riparian
claim 78 is that riparian landowners now have the burden of proving continuous beneficial use. 79 The court implied that riparian rights that have not
been exercised continuously will be henceforth viewed as having been
forfeited to the state in 1917.80
77. 175 Wash. 327, 330, 27 P.2d 690, 691 (1933) (court interprets "subject to existing rights" as
including riparian rights to domestic uses, meaning household and livestock, first exercised in 1919;
these "existing rights" vested when first used).
78. 103 Wn. 2d at 695-96, 694 P.2d at 1076-77.
79. The constitutionality of a retroactive continuous use requirement is questionable. The United
States Supreme Court has held that "[r]iparian rights once vested are property rights and cannot be
taken away except by the exercise of the right of eminent domain." Boquillas Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213
U.S. 339, 340 (1909). Where riparian owners have once exercised their rights, thus "vesting" them as
against the state, these rights may not be retroactively taken without compensation. After 1967, the
express legislative requirement of beneficial use effectively changed the nature of riparian property
rights in Washington. Thus, the constitutional issue would probably focus on rights forfeited between
1917 and 1967. See, e.g., Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324 (Ariz. 1981) (prospective
regulation under Ground Water Management Act of 1980 does not deny due process to owners of land
with regulated ground waters).
80. The court's strict application of retroactivity is evident in Department of Ecology v. Adsit, 103
Wn. 2d 698, 701 n. 1, 694 P.2d 1065, 1067 n. 1(1985) (fact issue of continuous use of spring water on
ranch property since 1893 is to be determined according to principles of Abbott). InAbbott, the riparian
landowner made use.of his water by irrigating at least fifteen acres in the 1920's. The court nonetheless
stated that Fuher lost his claim to unexercised riparian rights to irrigate and to domestic uses by 1932
and transferred only those riparian rights continuously exercised (i.e., none) to Riddle: "Fuher lost his
claim to these unexercised riparian rights by 1932 and therefore transferred only those exercised to
Riddle." Id. at 696, 694 P.2d at 1077. Although Fuher had not exercised his riparian right to irrigate
before 1917, he had done so within the fifteen-year grace period. The question, then, is why Fuher's
riparian right is forfeited in spite of his timely beneficial use. Apparently, Fuher lost his right by failing
to irrigate continuously after the 1920's. The court did not stat6 this directly, but did find that there was
no evidence of continuous use between the early 1920's and the early 1950's. Id. at 688, 694 P.2d at
1072-73. This finding evidently supports the court's conclusion that the referee properly denied Fuher's
riparian claim. However, the referee used a three-year forfeiture standard to reach his conclusion.
Application of the new fifteen-year period would presumably leave Fuher's riparian claim intact-in
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Riparian owners in Washington were not required, except in a condemnation or adjudication proceeding, to register and thereby quantify
their water rights until 1967.81 Before Abbott, riparian landowners could
claim a right to any reasonable riparian use, whether continuous or not,
subject to prior appropriation. Now they may be required to provide
evidence of beneficial use by everyone in their chain of title from 1917 to
the present. 82 Witnesses to beneficial uses in 1917 may not be easy to
locate. After sixty years or more, they may not remember the precise water
uses of neighboring riparian landowners. Because the state did not require
documentation of riparian uses before 1967, riparian landowners had no
reason to preserve documentary evidence. Riparian landowners may be
unable to establish continuous use if they did not anticipate a future need for
evidence of household uses, gardening, stock watering, or limited irrigation, such as for small hay crops. A retroactive requirement that riparian
owners quantify all common law riparian uses including natural uses in
their chain of title up to 1967 may, in many cases, be impossible to
perform.
Even if actual riparian requirements could be quantified, the court left
unanswered the critical question of when such rights are to be measured.
Several possibilities exist for quantification of riparian uses before 1932.
First, any exercise of riparian rights could suffice to preserve reasonable
future exercise of those rights. Second, the largest quantity of water
beneficially used before 1932 could set the limit for future riparian use.83
Third, the lowest quantity beneficially used by 1932 could set the limit for
future use; this appears to be the Abbott court's approach. Fourth, if water
effect overruling the referee's decision.
Abbott may thus be read to mean that between 1917 and 1967, the riparian owner is subject to
forfeiture of water not continuously used. In other words, a riparian owner's right may be forfeited by
operation of law for intermittent disuse regardless of his intent or of any damage to another. During that
period, appropriators were not subject to forfeiture of unused water rights, either by operation of law or
following a court proceeding. To successfully challenge an appropriator who had not used water
beneficially and continuously, the state or a private individual had, until 1967, the burden of proving
abandonment or laches. See supra note 24 (discussion of abandonment). After 1967, the rules changed
and both riparian owners and appropriators became subject to forfeiture after five years of disuse.
WAsH. REV. CODE§ 90.14.160 (1983).

81. The problem of quantifying is inherent in the riparian system of rights. The quantity of water to
which riparian landowners are entitled is a "reasonable" quantity. Under the common law, riparian
owners need not claim certain cubic feet of water per second, nor would they, under the common law.
notify their county auditor of the exact amounts they put to beneficial use. As a practical matter, the
problem of quantification is inherent in the appropriation system as well if an administrator must
determine what water is available to appropriators in a given watercourse.
82. See the discussion of the requirement of continuous use documentation in the companion case
to Abbott, Department of Ecology v. Adsit, 103 Wn. 2d 698, 701 n. I, 694 P.2d 1065, 1067 n. 1(1985).
83. See, e.g., In re Water Rights of the Upper Guadalupe, 642 S.W.2d 438, 444 (Tex. 1982)
(riparian owners entitled to full measure of maximum beneficial use during the test period from 1963 to
1967).
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were used by 1917, the level of use as of 1917 could determine the extent of
84
the "existing right" preserved by the 1917 Code.
C. Effect of Retroactive Requirementfor Change in Use Approval
Abbott applies to riparian landowners the statutory requirement that
change in use be approved by the supervisor of water resources. 85 This
effects a significant change in riparian rights which applies retroactively, as
of 1917. If Fuher or Riddle had sought approval after 1917 for the change in
use from logwashing to irrigation, then Fuher's rights to water for logwashing would presumably have been transferred to Riddle for irrigation.
Because neither did so, Riddle is now unable to recover his predecessor-ininterest's riparian water rights. Under the common law, riparian owners did
not give notice of changes in their water uses. Riparian water rights were
viewed as part of the land itself; they existed whether used or not. The 1917
Code did not require riparian landowners to seek permits for changes in
reasonable riparian uses. Thus, under pre-Abbott law, Fuher, as a riparian
owner, had a right to irrigate if his use was reasonable vis-a-vis other
riparian landowners. His sawmill and millpond use also had to be reasonable. That is, he could use water for one or the other or both unless he
unreasonably interfered with other riparian users or prior appropriators.
His domestic uses were absolute rights, not subject to prior appropriation
or to the test of reasonableness.
The Abbott requirements for approval of a change in use may exceed
what is required of an appropriator who changes his use. 86 As an appropriator, Fuher's claim in 1911 would probably have been sufficient to cover
any later changes in use because he claimed additional water for "irrigation
and other beneficial uses."' 87 If he had put 4.0 c.f.s. to beneficial use,
without intentionally abandoning it before 1967, then as an appropriator he
could have transferred this right to Riddle.
V. ABBOTT WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF WASHINGTON WATER
LAW
The problem of unused riparian rights was considered in 1967 by the
legislature and acted upon. To ensure the beneficial use of all state waters,
84. Once a reasonable beneficial use has been established, however, the level of use will necessarily increase or decrease as such things as the state of the art and water quality change.
85. 103 Wn. 2d at 696, 694 P.2d at 1077.
86. The Washington Supreme Court in 1924 found the law well settled that appropriators may
change their use of water to the detriment of riparian owners. In re Alpowa Creek, 129 Wash. 9, 14,224
P. 29, 31 (1924). Thus, approval by the state would serve little or no purpose, at least as to protecting

riparian owners.
87.

103 Wn. 2d at 688. 694 P.2d at 1072-73.
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the legislature in 1967 made most water rights subject to forfeiture after five
years of nonuse. 88 This prospective legislation applied equally to appropriators and riparian landowners. The statewide publicity given to the water
rights registration and to the penalty of forfeiture for failure to register gave
riparian owners notice of this prospective change in the nature of their
property right. 89
Under the 1967 Act, complete extinction of unused riparian rights is
neither called for nor implied. Considering the same issue in light of
California's hybrid system of water law, the California Supreme Court
concluded that the extinction of unexercised rights was not necessary to the
promotion of the reasonable and beneficial use of the state's waters. 90 As in
Washington, the California legislature had not clearly expressed an intention that these rights should be extinguished. The California court ruled
that, while future riparian rights could not be extinguished altogether, their
scope, nature and priority could be administratively determined in order to
promote the "state's interest in fostering the most reasonable and beneficial
use of its scarce water resources." 9 1 Thus, in California, riparian rights
would be limited or subordinated when the need for quantification or a
higher use arose.
Courts and water referees in Washington have been similarly limiting
riparian rights whenever the need arose since the nineteenth century. With
88. Certain rights are exempted from forfeiture for nonuse for "sufficient cause": (1) Drought, or
other unavailability of water; (2) Active service in the armed forces of the United States during military
crisis; (3) Nonvoluntary services in the armed forces of the United States: (4) The operation of legal
proceedings; (5) Federal laws imposing land or water use restrictions, or acreage limitations, or
production quotas. There is no relinquishment of any water right (1) claimed for power development
purposes as statutorily provided, (2) used for standby or reserve water supply in time of drought or low
flow period, (3) claimed for a determined future development to take place within fifteen years of the
statute or of the most recent beneficial use of the water right, (4) claimed for municipal water supply
purposes, or (5) not subject to appropriation under WASH. REv. CODE § 90.40.030. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 90.14.140 (1983).
89. The water rights registration provided information needed by the state to regulate use of its
waters. Both riparian owners and appropriators (those without current permits) were required to
quantify their water use. Their claims became prima facie evidence of their actual water use as of the
date of registration, provided that they were found to be using the claimed amount at the time of a water
rights adjudication. WASH. REV. CODE § 90.14.081 (1983). The validity of their claims would be
determined according to existing law in such an adjudication. Riparian landowners would be allowed a
reasonable use in relation to other riparian owners, subject to prior appropriators or prior adjudications
of their watercourse. Appropriators would be allowed the water they had claimed and diligently put to
beneficial use, as of the time of their original claim, subject to natural uses of riparian owners and any
other reasonable use that riparian owners had made or would make within a reasonable time. Riparian
owners of land patented or homesteaded after 1974, when the registration ended, would presumably
register their intended reasonable use and perfect their rights by exercise within five years, subject to all
prior apropriators on their waterbody.
90. In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d
656 (1979).
91. Id.. 158 Cal. Rptr. at 362, 599 P.2d at 669.
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the addition of statewide registration and a forfeiture statute, the state
legislature has provided a system of water law that allows full use of
Washington's waters.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Abbott court's pronouncement in 1985 of what Washington water
law has been since 1917 works an unnecessary hardship on the state's
riparian landowners, as well as contradicting several legislative enactments. The Abbott court required that riparian landowners had exercised all
consumptive riparian rights, including minimal domestic uses, by 1932;
otherwise, those rights would have been forfeited. The court further required that riparian uses had been continuous (or otherwise be forfeited)
and that any change in riparian use since 1917 must have been made with
administrative approval. These requirements are unnecessary because the
court's stated purpose of making the state's waters available for beneficial
use was legislatively achieved in the Water Rights Registration Act. The
Act's prospective change in the nature of riparian rights was widely
publicized, giving notice to the state's riparian landowners. In contrast, the
Abbott court's pronouncement of a retroactive change in the nature of
riparian rights since 1917 gives present riparian landowners no opportunity
to exercise water rights unused in the past, to document their past uses, or to
seek approval for past changes in use.
Lynn B. Squires
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